Introduction
During the summer of 2014, the international community was asked to help West African countries hit by the largest epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) ever described, with more than 28 000 cases and 11 000 deaths reported. [1] [2] [3] The French government decided to take part in this international response and to set up an Ebola treatment center (ETC) dedicated to infected healthcare workers in Conakry. The French Armed Forces Health Service (SSA), with the support of military battalions and logistic services, deployed this ETC in December 2014. It received 61 confirmed and suspected cases of EVD from January to July 2015 and was decommissioned in August 2015. French service members were deployed on a 2-month rotation schedule, leading to a constant flow of soldiers returning to France. French national recommendations 4 required that any suspected case of Ebola among these travelers be identified as soon as possible so that possible cases could be isolated until polymerase chain reaction results were obtained, in order to avoid prospective secondary dissemination of the virus in France. The French Armed Forces Health Service monitored armed forces returning from Guinea using the national civilian monitoring program and an additional follow-up program involving daily self-monitoring forms and telephone follow-up. This made it possible for the military chain of command to have regular updates regarding suspected cases and to receive an assessment of the situation at any time, if needed. The objective of this paper was to describe the principles and main results of this follow-up and to present the lessons learned to prepare for a future similar health crisis.
Materials and methods
Applying the national civilian recommendations, no quarantine or restricted involvement in clinical activities during the potential incubation period was prescribed 4 for any workers (service members included) returning from Ebola epidemic areas. Instead of quarantine, French health authorities implemented a self-monitoring of body temperature and any compatible symptoms twice a day during the 21 days following return from Guinea. Subjects returning from Guinea who reported low-risk exposure underwent passive monitoring meaning they were asked to self-record body temperature without external supervision. Subjects returning from Guinea who reported high-risk exposure were actively monitored with daily calls by civilian health authorities who asked subjects to take their temperature and report the result during the phone call. French civilian regional health agencies contacted every person upon landing to assess the exposure risk to Ebola during their mission then determined the appropriate monitoring category. The level of exposure was defined according to the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control risk assessment published in August 2014. 5 French health agencies were able to reach people using a dedicated national website called Ebosignea where every person returning from an Ebola epidemic area had to register before leaving the area. Ebosignea asked for data about the activity during the stay in Guinea, date of return to France, as well as personal address and contact information during the monitoring period.
If body temperature was 38°C or higher with or without compatible symptoms (e.g. asthenia, arthro-myalgia, diarrhea, abdominal pain, vomiting, hemorrhagic syndrome), returning people were considered to be suspected cases 6 and had to call the emergency coordination center to assess possibilities of exposure using a standardized questionnaire. If at least one exposure was reported, it was considered a possible case and secured transfer to the regional reference infectious facility was organized for etiological diagnosis, treatment and isolation.
In addition to the aforementioned follow-up and procedures that were implemented at the national level by civilian health authorities, a complementary procedure was added specifically for service members. A military public health specialist was deployed at the ETC to initiate follow-up and register service members on the Ebosignea website, making sure that every service members would be offered the national followup. Military personnel received a complete training on biosecurity procedures, as any other professional working in an Ebola treatment unit, but they also received detailed information before deployment and before leaving Guinea during mandatory sessions. To allow service members to perform their body temperature monitoring, an individual thermometer was provided before departure from Guinea to each of the personnel deployed returning to France, and axillary temperature measurement was recommended.
In order to fulfill the traceability requirements, specific monitoring forms were provided to service members to report body temperature twice a day during the first 21 days following their return to France. At the end of follow-up, completed forms were added to the service members' medical records and a copy was sent to the French military Center for Epidemiology and Public Health (CESPA) to close the follow-up and to be analyzed (Fig. 1) . The CESPA was also in charge of coordination and supervision of the follow-up. The CESPA sent weekly monitoring reports with follow-up outcomes to military and civilian stakeholders. In addition, a coordination unit emailed or phoned every service member on Days 1, 7 and 24 after return, for information, counseling or a reminder, as well as to provide individual or family support. The coordination unit also contacted regional health agencies before the return of service members in order to develop a collaborative network and check the data registered on the Ebosignea website. If a regional health agency had difficulty contacting a service member, the coordination unit alerted the military authorities.
Results
From December 2014 to August 2015, 410 military personnel were deployed in Guinea, among whom 364 were directly involved in the ETC. Roughly half of them were from the Armed Forces Health Service (46.1%), and rank distribution showed the highly technical profile of the detachment: 20.2% were officers (mainly physicians) and 42.2% were non-commissioned officers (Table 1) . They came from 20 of the 22 French administrative regions.
Dates of arrival and departure, exact location during their stay and potential viral exposure were known for 350 out of 410 service members (85.4%). The median duration of stay in Guinea was 69 days (IQ: 51-80, range: 5-247).
Returns from Guinea took place in 36 waves, with a mean of 11.4 people per wave (range: 1-74). Follow-up was passive for all returnees except for 18 service members who underwent active surveillance due to accidental exposure to the Ebola virus (mostly uncovered skin without projection of biological fluids). By the end of November 2015, 286 out of 410 (70%) people had turned in their monitoring forms to CESPA. Failure to return the monitoring form was significantly different according to the service member's mandate and was greater among service members who had traveled to Guinea before January 2015 to set up operations (64%) and service members not deployed at the ETC (49%) (P < 10 −5 ). Despite the fact that all the monitoring forms were not completed and returned, the coordination center at CESPA received health status information for all the service members concerned by this follow-up through its systematic email or phone call procedure at Days 1, 7 and 24 after return.
Regarding the temperatures measured, 179 out of 286 forms were entirely completed (62.6%). The mean temperature was 36.6°C (interindividual variability: mean standard deviation (SD) = 0.39°C; intraindividual variability: mean SD = 0.36°C) with an expected circadian variation (0.2°C difference between morning and night mean temperatures) and gender variation (0.1°C difference between women's (n = 43) and men's (n = 136) mean temperatures). Onset of symptoms appeared after an average lapse of 7.9 days following departure from Guinea, with a bimodal distribution during the first and third weeks of follow-up. Among the 22 subjects, 11 called emergency coordination centers as prescribed in case of clinical symptoms and/or hyperthermia (≥38°C) during the first 21 days following their return. Three of them were considered to be possible EVD cases and transferred to the local reference infectious disease treatment facility (<2 h away) for Ebola testing. The others were isolated at home for 24-48 h and then excluded as suspected cases due to their medical history and after a second assessment of potential viral exposure. Nobody was confirmed as an EVD case. The flowchart of this monitoring is presented in Fig. 2 .
Acceptability and burden
This follow-up represented a considerable workload for both civilian agencies and CESPA, whose coordination unit had to manage a large number of emails (n = 373 emails, collective or individual) and phone calls (n = 439) with returning service members, 65% of which were made outside of duty hours. Furthermore, 1 109 emails were sent to civilian authorities and to the theater of operations in Guinea.
Service members were asked to comment on organization implemented. Among the 130 service members who answered, only one clearly expressed his dissatisfaction. Service members did not report that the monitoring negatively impacted professional or personal relationships.
In order to provide regular feedback to the military hierarchy and civilian decision-makers on monitoring results, the coordination unit sent them weekly updated monitoring reports. This feedback was also regularly and widely disseminated in the French Armed Forces Health Service.
Discussion
The specific monitoring organized for French military personnel deployed in Guinea in addition to the national follow-up for French citizens allowed CESPA to follow all exposed personnel during the first 21 days after their return, know their health status on a near real-time basis, and be aware of all alerts. Despite the fact that some of the monitoring forms were not received at the end of the follow-up, the French military health service was able to supervise the follow-up for the service members deployed in Guinea and to produce feedback to the chain of command on the health status of returned personnel at any time. None of the French service members deployed were confirmed positive for EVD. Overall, the feedback on this system was positive. First of all, since it was backed by the national civilian monitoring program set up in December 2014, our system was operational in a few days. The system's efficiency can be attributed to the fact that the initial risk exposure assessment was performed directly by the civilian national health administration, as it would be for any French citizen. Additional monitoring was implemented by the Armed Forces to keep the military chain of command informed of the situation, as has already been observed during other public health alerts. 7 Dedicated tools and a specific information circuit geared towards decision-makers were implemented to help supervise this monitoring. This collaboration between civil and armed forces agencies created a climate of trust and reassurance for deployed service members, their families and military chain of command, in the context of an emotionally charged mission.
Secondly, monitoring was rather well accepted by the service members, in spite of its tediousness. It was a continuation of the monitoring implemented in Guinea during deployment, where body temperature was monitored twice a day. A specific protocol in case of temperature increase was set up. Moreover, service members were informed in detail on this monitoring before, during and after the mission. Information tools (leaflets, Frequently Asked Questions section on the coordination unit's website) were created for the military personnel and their families. We also think that personalized direct contact with public health officers contributed to the acceptability of this assiduous monitoring. Proximity to family and home, as well as the few restrictions prescribed (not traveling outside continental France was the only restriction) during the 21 days following return, most likely contributed to good compliance. Finally, half of the service members deployed were healthcare workers and were aware of the importance of this monitoring and the high level of medical support available in case of a suspicion of Ebola.
In comparison to other European or North American countries, policies were different and more or less restrictive. 8 For instance, in the USA, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommendations, healthcare workers were under direct active monitoring, which meant that they had to measure their body temperature twice a day for 21 days with direct supervision by an official from the relevant health authority. Depending on the level of risk, restrictions on travel, work and attendance at public gatherings could be prescribed. 9, 10 Moreover, despite the existence of CDC recommendations, policies were not homogeneous, and some states decided to implement highly restrictive measures and to organize quarantines. 11, 12 These initiatives were quite controversial, as quarantines could have led to the stigmatization of returning service members and could have discouraged volunteers from taking part in such missions, as has been reported previously. [13] [14] [15] In the UK, monitoring was based on a twice daily passive temperature monitoring and recommendations to restrict their use of public transportation or clinical activities in certain situations. 8, 16, 17 The 2014-15 EVD outbreak in West Africa showed that such monitoring for people returning from a high-risk area should be implemented, but harmonizing recommendations for healthcare workers from one country to the other would make things easier. It would be better to develop standardized, science-based recommendations, with a balance between the need for efficiency, protection of the population, and preservation of personal freedom. If such a situation should happen again in the future, our recommendation, based on the lessons learned, would be to balance the international guidelines produced by World Health Organization or other centers of reference with the national specificities and constraints.
Our system had several limitations. First of all, as highlighted in the results section, over 20% of returned personnel did not turn in their self-monitoring forms to CESPA. However, as the information on health status was obtained for all the service members, we do not consider them as missing data. Our proposal to address this issue for similar situations in the future would be to develop an electronic device to collect information but also to make the circulation of information between service members being monitored and the coordination unit more direct, in order to improve the quality of the information and data completeness.
The other point is the crucial need of human resources to implement this monitoring program and its coordination and supervision. Our model required few military public health experts, which was due to the fact that the initial risk assessment was performed by civilian agencies. However, appropriate monitoring requires enough personnel and some equipment to be completely devoted to the monitoring, making them unavailable for other projects for a period of several days or weeks.
Lastly, the monitoring presented above relied on selfmeasurement and recording of body temperature twice a day, so the data collected may be partially biased. We suspect that in some cases service members did not report a temperature increase or symptoms if they thought it was a benign infection lasting a few hours. It is also suspected that, due to professional constraints or by omission, some of them did not measure their temperature for the full 21 days and probably did not measure it regularly at the same time every day. Despite recommendations, some service members may also have self-medicated, masking fever and/or symptoms. All these limitations should be taken into account to implement a similar monitoring in the future. We should think about a new way to report data using electronic tools and instant transmission by means of an application filled in by the patient or a connected thermometer. Such digitalization of the records could facilitate the implementation of an efficient algorithm to help decision-making. However, such a system would entail developing the application and working on it proactively before a new crisis occurs. All the key lessons learned from the French armed forces experience are summarized in Fig. 3 .
Conclusion
The international community participated actively in the West Africa 2014-15 EVD outbreak. Importing EVD to non-affected areas was a serious risk, and several measures were implemented worldwide to control it, including monitoring the temperature of healthcare workers returning from the outbreak area. This outbreak, as well as the report of imported cases of viral hemorrhagic fever to Europe or the United States, showed how important it is to continue developing monitoring tools and strategies to follow-up on persons returning from such areas. It is foreseeable that similar monitoring will be put in place again, in particular for military personnel, who are constantly exposed to infectious risks during their missions. Such a system is needed so that military personnel remain willing and motivated to continue to volunteer for this type of mission and to allow authorities to control the risk of importation. If we had to perform such a monitoring again in the future, we would maintain the principle of integration in the national system but we would try to improve and anticipate the information sharing with our civilian partners. We would also call for an active coordination of the monitoring by public health experts, to fulfill the Force health protection mission.
